



When does a court construe a statute, treaty, or constitutional
provision and when hold it inapplicable instead? This question has
received almost no attention from courts or scholars. They usually
assume that when a party in litigation relies on a statute, it must
be construed-that is, it must supply an answer to the question
presented in the case, whether or not the answer is favorable to the
party relying on the provision.1
Yet to construe a statute at all is to resolve an important ques-
tion in favor of the party invoking it. The interesting questions in
litigation involve statutes that are ambiguous when applied to a
particular set of facts. The construction of an ambiguous document
is a work of judicial creation or re-creation. Using the available
hints and tools-the words and structure of the statute, the subject
matter and general policy of the enactment, the legislative history,
the lobbying positions of interest groups, and the temper of the
times-judges try to determine how the Congress that enacted the
statute either actually resolved or would have resolved a particular
issue if it had faced and settled it explicitly at the time.2 Judges
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Some say that because of the imprecision of language, or the passage of time between
enactment and interpretation, the appropriate goal of construction is not the implementa-
tion of the design (real or imputed) of the legislature but the creation of such rules as judges
conclude best serve the common weal. E.g., G. CALABREsi, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF
STATTEs (1982); Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. Rv. 373 (1982). Arguments such
as Levinson's overstate the vagueness of language. Wittgenstein showed that no system of
language can be self-contained and that meaning thus must depend in part on logical struc-
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have substantial leeway in construction. Inferences almost always
conflict, and the enacting Congress is unlikely to come back to life
and "prove" the court's construction wrong. The older the statute
the more the inferences will be in conflict, and the greater the
judges' freedom.
If, however, the court finds a statute inapplicable to the sub-
ject of the litigation, it never begins this task of creative construc-
tion. Even if the judge knows how Congress would have handled
the question presented, the court will do nothing. It will say to the
litigant: "Too bad, but legislative intentions are not legal rules."
Whoever relies on the statute loses. The court will tell the litigant
to seek a statute embodying the never-expressed conclusions of the
legislature.
The choice between construction and a declaration of inappli-
cability thus may make all the difference to the case. This essay is
a sketch of some considerations affecting that choice. I suggest that
the conventional assumption, that all statutes supply or authorize
the creation of an "answer" (even if unfavorable) to the question
posed by the litigants relying on them, is difficult to sustain.
II
A paper about the domain of statutes needs a preamble about
its own domain. Throughout this paper I discuss the difference be-
tween "construing" and "not construing" a statute. The reader is
entitled to object that there is no such distinction, that to declare a
ture and understandings supplied by a community of readers, but this does not establish
that words contain no meaning or that judges may disregard such meaning as most readers
would find. There is no "private language"; meaning lies in shared reactions to text. If read-
ers have a common understanding of structure they may decipher meaning accurately. The
appropriate treatment of language skepticism ultimately is not much different from that of
Humean fact skepticism. See generally Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup.
CT. REv. 85, 90-94; Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings
and Courts "To Say What the Law Is," 23 Amz. L. REv. 581, 592-97 (1981); White, Law as
Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 T:x. L. Rav. 415, 421-28 (1982). If
statutes' words do not convey meaning and bind judges, why should judges' words bind or
even interest the rest of us? Arguments such as Calabresi's err in supposing that only the
designs of today's legislators count and that the application of the common law method can
yield principled (which is to say consistent) rules. Judges' claim of the power to adjudicate
supposes that at least some of the decisions of people now dead must still be enforced, cf.
Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography (Book Review), 96 HARv. L. REv. 534, 543-
44 (1982) (discussing judicial updating of statutes), and the belief that courts can establish a
principled jurisprudence is simply fallacious. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95
HAnv. L. lav. 802, 811-32 (1982).
Nonetheless, although I think the original-meaning approach to statutory construction
right, I do not defend it in this essay. My purpose is to show the difficulty of justifying the
search for and implementation of that meaning in a class of cases.
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statute inapplicable to a dispute is an act of construction, and that
I am therefore talking nonsense. There is certainly a sense in
which every time a judge picks up and reads a statute, if only to
put it down immediately, he has "construed" or "interpreted" it.
Why else did he put it down? In distinguishing between construc-
tion and nonconstruction, I do not mean to deny the importance of
finding the meaning of the enactment.3 Finding the meaning is the
aim of picking up the statute in the first instance. I address instead
some of the considerations pertinent to deciding whether the stat-
ute indeed supplies an answer or whether it is to be put down and
disregarded.
One can think of this as an exercise in finding a general rule of
construing statutes to find their boundaries. The terminology is
unimportant, and my meaning (the essay's domain) should be clear
if you think of it as an effort to identify some principles useful in
deciding when to act as if no law on the subject had been passed.
Consider, for example, whether a statute providing for the
leashing of "dogs" also requires the leashing of cats (because the
statute really covers the category "animals") or wolves (because
the statute really covers the category "canines") or lions ("danger-
ous animals").4 Most people would say that the statute does not go
beyond dogs, because after all the verbal torturing of the words has
been completed it is still too plain for argument what the statute
means. Perhaps it is a quibble, but in my terminology this becomes
a decision that the statute "applies" only to dogs. For rules about
the rest of the animal kingdom we must look elsewhere.
The distinction between application and interpretation is a
line worth drawing-however difficult to maintain-because of the
malleability of words. To find the leash statute limited to dogs af-
S "Meaning of the enactment," and not the "intent of its framers." A statute has mean-
ing apart from the drafters' personal intentions, and to speak of intent is to commit the
"intentional fallacy" properly denounced in literary criticism. Thus Holmes had it right:
[A statute] does not disclose one meaning conclusively according to the laws of lan-
guage. Thereupon we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean
in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which
they were used.. . . But the normal speaker of English is merely a special variety, a
literary form, so to speak, of our old friend the prudent man. He is external to the
particular writer, and a reference to him as a criterion is simply another instance of the
externality of the law....
. . We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute
means.
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417, 417-19 (1899), re-
printed in O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 204, 207 (1920).
4 Cf. 2 H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1409 (tent. ed. 1958).
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ter a bout of interpretation inevitably has the air of arbitrariness.
Why not treat it as a statute about "animals" or "dangerous ani-
mals" or "canines"? The invocation of "plain meaning" just sweeps
under the rug the process by which meaning is divined. Too often
the meaning of a statute is smuggled into the rules that determine
when, and why, to cut off debate. The philosophy of language, and
most particularly the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, has established
that sets of words do not possess intrinsic meanings and cannot be
given them; to make matters worse, speakers do not even have de-
terminative intents about the meanings of their own words. Thus
when a speaker says "dogs" we cannot be certain that he did not
mean "dangerous animals" unless that question was present to his
mind and the structure of the utterance indicates his resolution of
the problem. When Congress enacts a $10,000 jurisdictional
amount, we cannot be certain whether it means $10,000 in nominal
dollars or real (inflation-adjusted) ones. When the Constitution
says that the President must be thirty-five years old, we cannot be
certain whether it means thirty-five as the number of revolutions
of the world around the sun, as a percentage of average life expec-
tancy (so that the Constitution now has age fifty as a minimum),
or as a minimum number of years after puberty (so the minimum
now is thirty or so). Each of these treatments has some rational set
of reasons, goals, values, and the like to recommend it. If the
meaning of language depends on a community of understanding
among readers, none is "right." But unless the community of read-
ers is to engage in ceaseless (and thus pointless) babble-and un-
less, moreover, the community is willing to entrust almost bound-
less discretion to judges as oracles of the community's
standards-there is a need for some broader set of rules about
when to engage in the open-ended process of construction.
In a world of language skepticism, every attempt to "construe"
a statute is a transfer of a substantial measure of decision-making
authority from the speaker to the interpreter. To find that there is
"law" on a given subject is to endow the courts with authority they
lacked before. It is therefore worthwhile to demand that, before
courts begin the process of "construction," they ascertain that the
legislature has conferred the power of interpretation. Thus I ask
for indulgence in referring to a first step, the step of determining
the application or applicability of a statute.
5 L. WriTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS §§ 138-242 (1953). See also S.




I put to one side the possibility that determining the statute's
applicability always is the same thing as determining whether the
statute supports the party relying on it. The decision to construe
the statute at all cannot be based on the legislature's actual deci-
sion, for if it made an ascertainable decision there is no difficult
question of construction. Take, for example, the question whether
the Federal Communications Commission, which under the Com-
munications Act regulates the practices of radio and television
broadcasters, also may regulate the practices of cable television op-
erators.' If the Communications Act said something like "the FCC
may not regulate anything or anyone other than the practices and
parties named in this Act," there would be nothing to discuss. One
could invoke an actual decision of Congress concerning the domain
of its enactment.
Statutes rarely contain anything like this, in part because
Congress does not anticipate each problem that subsequently
arises and in part because members of Congress know that zipper
clauses in statutes just invite clever evasions. Thus the statute
does not choose between the opposing lines of argument that, on
the one hand, cable systems compete with over-the-air television
and may, unless regulated, upset or undo the regulation of TV ex-
pressly created by the statute and that, on the other hand, the only
reason for regulating over-the-air TV was the problem of many sig-
nals competing for few frequencies and interfering with one an-
other, a problem that never arises for cable systems.
If the question of a statute's domain may not often be resolved
by reference to actual design, it may never properly be resolved by
reference to imputed design. To impute a design to Congress is to
engage in an act of construction. There must be some reason, inde-
pendent of the answer the court thinks Congress would give (or
would have given) to the question under consideration, that justi-
fies the court in supplying that answer in litigation.
The point may be clearest if we take a case in which the court
can determine the legislators' design or meaning with certainty.
Suppose that within a month after Congress passed the Communi-
cations Act a court declares the statute inapplicable to cable televi-
sion. The FCC consequently lacks regulatory jurisdiction. Immedi-
ately thereafter, during the same session of Congress that passed
I E.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
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the Communications Act, the pertinent committee in each house of
Congress reports out a short amendment giving the FCC jurisdic-
tion. The texts of the amendments are identical, and the unani-
mous committee reports state that the amendment is necessary to
correct a terrible oversight. Each report states that the committee
originally intended to confer on the FCC jurisdiction over cable
systems, but that during the session the members of the staff
charged with drafting the language to implement the design re-
signed, and their successors, unaware of the original plan, had not
carried it out. As a result the legislation did not implement the
agreed-on plan, and this technical amendment would perfect the
statute.
Suppose further that the leaders of both parties endorse the
amendment, and the President expresses willingness to sign it
when it reaches his desk. Yet although the amendment encounters
no opposition, it also does not pass. Perhaps it never is scheduled
for time on the floor because other, more pressing legislation con-
sumes the remainder of the session. Perhaps members who support
the amendment hold it hostage in an effort to secure enactment of
some other bill over which there is vigorous debate. Perhaps the
bill is so popular that it becomes the vehicle for a school prayer
amendment or some other factious legislation, in the hope that it
will carry the disputed legislation with it, but the strategy succeeds
only in killing both proposals. There are a hundred ways in which
a bill can die even though there is no opposition to it.
What should a court do with this unambiguous evidence of
legislative design or meaning? The conventional answer is that an
abortive attempt to enact a bill has no effect. Despite the informa-
tion it conveys about the meaning of Congress, it neither adds to
nor detracts from the meaning of the legislation actually enacted.7
It is even conceivable, although on the facts of this hypothetical
E.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397,41-6-18 (1967)
(an agency may change its regulations and statutory interpretation even though Congress
refused to amend the statute to authorize the new rules); FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S.
597, 608-12 (1966) (failure to enact amending legislation conferring jurisdiction is of no mo-
ment one way or the other); Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47 (1950) (same). Cf.
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979) (committee report from later session
is of no effect even though subsequent legislation passed and the committee was dominated
by members of the committee that drafted the original legislation); Commissioner v. Acker,
361 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1959) (legislative intent is ineffective unless embodied in statutory
words); Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) ("What the Government asks [and
does not get] is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the




unlikely, that the failure to amend the statute will be taken as en-
dorsement of the initial judicial treatment of it.8 And this rule
works in both directions: if the initial Act had granted jurisdiction
over cable systems, subsequent failed amendments could not have
diminished that power.
The treatment of subsequent events as ineffective to alter the
meaning of a statute is based on a realistic perception of the legis-
lative process. Often proposals with wide support fail of enactment
because the legislature lacks the time to enact them or because
agreed-on bills become pawns in larger struggles. A court could not
treat these widely-supported but never-enacted proposals as law
without dishonoring the procedural aspects of the legislative pro-
cess, in which lack of time is a vital ingredient. Under article I of
the Constitution, not to mention the rules of the chambers of Con-
gress, support is not enough for legislation. If the support cannot
be transmuted into an enrolled bill, nothing happens. The world
goes on as before.
If such powerful evidence of the intent of Congress about the
domain of its statutes is not dispositive in matters of construction
versus inapplicability, the usual kind of evidence is even less help-
ful. To delve into the structure, purpose, and legislative history of
the original statute is to engage in a sort of creation. It is to fill in
blanks. And without some warrant-other than the existence of
the blank-for a court to fill it in, the court has no authority to
decide in favor of the party invoking the blank-containing statute.
IV
All of this means that there must be a meta-rule of statutory
construction, a rule about when to engage in construction. The de-
cision to engage in construction must depend on something other
than the substantive answer that a constructive exercise would
supply.
One may object that the search for such a rule is itself illegiti-
mate, because the establishment of any rule reduces the power of
Congress by forcing it to enact around the rule if dissatisfied. Be-
cause displacing any rule, however useful ordinarily, is costly, and
because Congress is not always willing or able to bear these costs,
this argument would run, judges must refrain from adopting any
background rule and approach each statute with empty minds.
8 E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982);
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
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This argument would prove too much. It would require aban-
doning not only meta-rules but also ordinary rules of construc-
tion-including judges' resort to their understandings of En-
glish-that aid in deciphering or constructing a legislative
meaning. At least some rules of statutory construction are useful
for the same reason rules are useful in interpreting contracts. They
spare legislators the need to decide and announce, law by law, the
rules that will be used for interpreting the code of words they se-
lect. The general reduction in the costs of legislating makes up for
the costs of reversing the background rule in the event it should be
ill-adapted to some given statute. Rules are desirable not because
legislators in fact know or use them in passing laws but because
rules serve as off-the-rack provisions that spare legislators the
costs of anticipating all possible interpretive problems and legislat-
ing solutions for them.9
What, then, is the appropriate background rule? One possibil-
ity, not excluded by the discussion in parts II and Inl, is the rule
now followed by default: treat as applicable all statutes invoked by
the parties. This is not, however, a very satisfactory rule. In choos-
ing background rules for understanding and completing contracts,
courts ordinarily select the options they think the parties would
have picked had they thought of the subsequently surfacing
problems and been able to bargain about them beforehand at no
cost. Such an approach minimizes both bargaining costs and the
number of mistakes. A similar approach to selecting the meta-rule
of construction suggests that "every statute applies" is not a good
candidate for adoption.
Almost all statutes are compromises, and the cornerstone of
many a compromise is the decision, usually unexpressed, to leave
certain issues unresolved. Whether these issues have been identi-
fied (so that the lack of their resolution might be called inten-
tional) or overlooked (so that the lack of their resolution is of
ambiguous portent) is unimportant. What matters to the compro-
misers is reducing the chance that their work will be invoked sub-
sequently to achieve more, or less, than they intended, thereby up-
setting the balance of the package.
This concern for balance is not confined to interest group (pie-
slicing) legislation, in which different people tug different ways on
legislators for larger shares of a fixed pie, and the statute fixes the
' Cf. Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassess-
ment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REv. 1217, 1227-31 (1982) (discussing statutory construction in
the context of commercial law).
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size of each slice. 10 Balance is as important in public interest (pie-
enlarging) legislation, for the structure of the statute will deter-
mine how the public interest is to be achieved. Is it to be done
strictly through governmental rules and regulation (in which case
the statute supplies a rule of decision) or in part by the interac-
tions and bargains of private parties (in which event the statute
does not apply)? Legislators seeking only to further the public in-
terest may conclude that the provision of public rules should reach
so far and no farther, whether because of deliberate compromise,
because of respect for private orderings, or because of uncertainty
coupled with concern that to regulate in the face of the unknown is
to risk loss for little gain. No matter how good the end in view,
achievement of the end will have some cost, and at some point the
cost will begin to exceed the benefits.
Thus it is exceptionally implausible to suppose that legisla-
tures, faced explicitly with the task of selecting a background rule,
would decide that all statutes invoked by litigants should be
deemed to govern their disputes. Such a rule is the equivalent of
charging courts with supplying, in cases of doubt, "more in the
same vein" as the statute in question. In the case of interest group
legislation it is most likely that the extent of the bargain-the per-
tinent "vein"-is exhausted by the subjects of the express com-
promises reflected in the statute. The legislature ordinarily would
rebuff any suggestion that judges be authorized to fill in blanks in
the "spirit" of the compromise. Most compromises lack "spirit,"
and in any event one part of the deal is to limit the number of
blanks to be filled in. (Sometimes the compromise is on a principle
to be applied later, and I suggest below that such statutes should
be applied more readily than other compromises.)
In the case of public interest legislation it is more likely that
the legislature would authorize blank filling, but the extent of this
preference is far from certain. If the purpose of the public interest
statute is to come as close to the line of over-regulation as possi-
ble-that is, to achieve the benefits of regulation right up to the
point where the costs of further benefits exceed the value of those
benefits-then to authorize blank filling defeats the purpose of the
statute. If the court always responds to the invocation of this stat-
ute by attempting to read the minds of its framers and supply
"more in the same vein," and makes its share of errors, every one
of them will carry the statute to where costs exceed benefits. It will
10 I adopt here the classification system of Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Read-
ing of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHi. L. R.v. 263, 269-72 (1982).
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either do nothing or produce too much of a good thing.
An example may be helpful. Congress has regulated tender of-
fers for corporate stock by establishing disclosure rules and mini-
mum durations for such offers. The public interest justification ad-
vanced for the statute is that the time and information enable
investors to make intelligent decisions and so perfect the market
for corporate control. Another public interest justification, ad-
vanced more recently, is that the time enables auctions for targets
to develop. The statute provides for enforcement by the SEC and
the criminal law. It does not, however, address enforcement by
means of suits filed by firms that are objects of offers. When a
target files a suit, should the court fill in this blank by applying the
statute and divining how Congress would have resolved the prob-
lem, or should it declare the statute inapplicable (and thus no sup-
port for the suit)? 1 If the statute is a public interest statute that
already has come right up to the line in offering protections for
investors, and the court undertakes to construe this and similar
laws, the process harms those the statute meant to protect.12 It
overprotects investors by raising the costs to bidders, thus discour-
aging them without corresponding gains to the target's sharehold-
ers. s A construction allowing the target to maintain the suit harms
investors, and a construction disallowing the target's suit simply
leaves the plan untouched (and thus offers no potential benefit to
offset the potential harm of the inaccurate construction). A rule of
no-application would avoid this risk.
This is not to argue that a uniform rule of no-construction in
such cases best implements Congress's plan, or even that in the
tender-offer case a decision permitting suits by targets would harm
the group Congress wanted to help. The point, rather, is that a
legislature rationally may conclude that the rule "apply all stat-
The judicial treatment of suits by targets has been to construe the statute and, gen-
erally, to use the statute as the basis of the suit. E.g., Prudent Real Estate Trust v. John-
camp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.). But cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24-42 (1977) (bidder lacks a claim for damages under the statute).
12 The Supreme Court sometimes recognizes that more of what the legislature wanted is
not always better. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980).
23 It should be plain that there is such a line. Its existence is the basis of Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982) (holding that additional protection offered by state
statutes would "overprotect" investors to their detriment). See also Easterbrook & Fischel,
Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MicH. L. Rav. 1155 (1982). For a debate on
the costs and benefits of tender offer auctions, which may be initiated or prolonged by liti-
gation, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (1982); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and
Extension, 35 STA. L. REv. 23 (1982); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Pas-
sivity in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. Rv. 51 (1982).
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utes" is undesirable even if all statutes are public interest statutes.
The nature of the optimal meta-rule of construction depends not
only on whether the statute at hand is private-interest or public-
interest legislation but also on whether the legislation comes close
to the line at which benefits begin to exceed costs. If the legislature
regularly passes laws that, in its view, approach this line, then it
may rationally prefer courts to tend to limit the domain of laws
that do not speak directly to a subject. If, however, the legislature
regularly passes public interest laws that still have some distance
to go before they reach the point at which detriments begin to ex-
ceed benefits, it would be more sanguine about a rule of universal
construction.
When enacting public interest laws legislators regularly at-
tempt to approach that critical line-at least in light of the gains
and losses they then perceive. A legislature that created a basket of
laws containing many interest group statutes and many exhaustive
public interest statutes would not be likely to adopt today's im-
plicit judicial approach of universal construction. It would try to
distinguish statutes to be applied (construed) from statutes to be
declared inapplicable in the event of substantial ambiguity.
There is a further reason why a legislature able to specify a
rule at no cost would not select universal construction. A rule of
universal application breaks down when each party invokes an am-
biguous statute. In almost any dispute it will be possible to point
to a series of statutes enacted at different times. The dominant
purpose of some labor laws is to curb what is seen as the excessive
power of employers over their workers; the dominant purpose of
others is to curb what is seen as the excessive power of unions.
What is a court to do when the union invokes one, the employer
invokes another, and each asks the court to determine the case by
construing the law-that is, by determining how the legislature
that passed the law would have resolved this kind of case, had it
been put? The outcome of the case will depend on which session of
the legislature the court selects as the controlling one, and that
cannot be done with a rule of universal construction.
A court might try to escape this bind by choosing to apply the
more recent law, but that would arbitrarily deny effect to the de-
sign (both substantive and with respect to rules of construction)
established by the earlier legislature. The court could not justify
this choice as one of construction, because each of the two meet-
ings of the legislature might want its "spirit" to control in the
event two ambiguous laws, neither expressly governing, should be
invoked. Only a rule imposed from outside the legislative process
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The University of Chicago Law Review
could break the deadlock.
If a rule of universal construction is unsatisfactory, what of a
rule of universal refusal to apply statutes whose domains do not
clearly include the subject of the litigation? Here courts would en-
counter difficulties almost the mirror image of those produced by a
rule of universal construction. A rule of universal refusal to extend
a statute's domain would deny to the legislature the option of en-
acting public interest laws that, stopping well short of the point
where they produce too much of a good thing, charge the judiciary
with the task of creating remedies for whatever new problems show
up later on. The statute books are full of laws, of which the Sher-
man Act is a good example, that effectively authorize courts to cre-
ate new lines of common law. These laws "apply" even though they
do not always supply a rule of decision; the "state action exemp-
tion" to the antitrust laws is a good example of how a statute may
apply to all combinations in restraint of trade but forbid only
some. 14 Unless such generative statutes are unconstitutional there
is little warrant for refusing to implement them through the guise
of adopting a meta-rule of statutory construction.
V
If the limiting cases-no rule, a rule of universal application,
and a rule of severely restricted domain-are not plausible candi-
dates, what is? In this part I sketch and offer the skeleton of the
defense of a more plausible rule. It would be fatuous to suggest
that this is the only plausible candidate. My purpose is not to ex-
clude all competing candidates but rather to offer a starting point
for analysis.
My suggestion is that unless the statute plainly hands courts
the power to create and revise a form of common law, the domain
of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its fram-
ers and expressly resolved in the legislative process. Unless the
party relying on the statute could establish either express resolu-
tion or creation of the common law power of revision, the court
would hold the matter in question outside the statute's domain.
The statute would become irrelevant, the parties (and court) re-
mitted to whatever other sources of law might be applicable.
This approach overlaps the "clear statement" principle of con-
14 See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 48-57 (1982).
See also Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 24,
40-43 (1983) (discussing the difference between application and meaning for antitrust laws).
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struction that is often, but erratically, invoked by courts that deny
the power to resolve the issue put to them.15 The court will say
something like: "The legislature may well have supported the
party relying on the statute, had it thought about this problem,
but if the legislature expects us to reach such a result in so sensi-
tive an area, it must state its conclusion clearly." The court then
explains why it thinks the subject matter of the legislation coun-
sels hesitation. Perhaps it affects state-federal relations, perhaps it
creates startling remedies, perhaps it raises serious constitutional
questions, perhaps it departs from the common law (and so from
the judges' conception of the good).
As others have pointed out, the "clear statement" principle
usually fails as a useful tool of construction because it cannot
demonstrate why the legislature would have wanted the court to
hesitate just because the subject matter of the law is "sensitive." 16
Likely it thinks that making hard decisions in sensitive areas is
what courts are for. The "clear statement" principle can be used
by courts seeking to decide by indirection (the very thing they ask
the legislature not to do) and to elide responsibilities given by stat-
utes. Invocation of the "clear statement" rule thus has been taken
by some as a sign of wilful misconstruction of the statute.
The "clear statement" approach nonetheless reflects the truth
that some statutes support judicial gap filling more than others do.
The problem in the "clear statement" approach lies not in the dec-
laration that courts sometimes will demand explicit legislative res-
olution and will refuse to fill statutory gaps, but rather in the con-
ditions giving rise to that demand. The meta-rule I have suggested
above is a "clear statement" approach revised to turn on the
method the legislature has adopted. If it enacts some sort of code
of rules, the code will be taken as complete (until amended); gaps
will go unfilled. If instead it charges the court with a common law
function, the court will solve new problems as they arise, but using
today's wisdom rather than conjuring up the solutions of a legisla-
ture long prorogued.
This is just a slightly different way of making the point that
2 E.g., United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407, 412-13 (1982); Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24-27 (1981); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251, 265 (1972).
16 H. FRmNDLY, supra note 2, at 210-12; Posner, supra note 2, at 815-16.
17 H. Friendly, Statutorification of Federal Law (address to the Judicial Conference of
the Sixth Circuit July 1981) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); Note,
Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme
Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 892, 904-07 (1982).
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judicial pursuit of the "values" or aims of legislation is a sure way
of defeating the original legislative plan. A legislature that seeks to
achieve Goal X can do so in one of two ways. First, it can identify
the goal and instruct courts or agencies to design rules to achieve
the goal. In that event, the subsequent selection of rules imple-
ments the actual legislative decision, even if the rules are not what
the legislature would have selected itself. The second approach is
for the legislature to pick the rules. It pursues Goal X by Rule Y.
The selection of Y is a measure of what Goal X was worth to the
legislature, of how best to achieve X, and of where to stop in pur-
suit of X.18 Like any other rule, Y is bound to be imprecise, to be
over- and under-inclusive. This is not a good reason for a court,
observing the inevitable imprecision, to add to or subtract from
Rule Y on the argument that, by doing so, it can get more of Goal
X. The judicial selection of means to pursue X displaces and di-
rectly overrides the legislative selection of ways to obtain X. 11 It
denies to legislatures the choice of creating or withholding gap-
"S The stopping place problem is well illustrated by Thomas v. Washington Gas Light
Co., 448 U.S. 261, 280 (1980), in which a plurality of the Court permitted successive awards
of workers' compensation, under the laws of different states, on the reasoning that because
each state had an "interest in providing adequate compensation of the injured worker,"
neither's policy would be offended by allowing the worker to obtain two awards and then
collect the more generous. Yet all workers' compensation schemes involve a tradeoff between
the level and probability of the award. Suppose State A has a maximum award of $200 per
month for a certain disability, and a worker who was injured in particular circumstances has
a 95% probability of receiving the award. Then the worker's application for benefits and the
employer's obligation have expected values of $190 per month each. State B has a much
higher maximum benefit of $380 per month, but because an injury of this sort is only debat-
ably within the statute the worker has a 50% chance of recovery. Again, the worker's ex-
pected value is $190 per month, identical to the employer's expected cost. If the worker first
applies in State A and then applies in State B, and is entitled to the higher of the awards
(provided he prevails in State A first), then the expected value of the applications for bene-
fits is $275.50. (Computed from 0.05 x 0.00 + 0.95 (0.5 x 200 + 0.5 x 380) = 275.50.) He
gets more than either state provided, and each state's decision that the employer's liability
per similarly-situated worker be fixed at $190 per month is frustrated.
19 For a striking illustration of the difference between pursuing the legislature's meth-
ods and pursuing the legislature's goals, compare Golden v. Garafolo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir.
1982) (Winter, J.) (methods) with Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.)
(goals). See also Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct.
1556, 1560-61 (1983) ("although NEPA states its goals in sweeping terms of human health
and welfare, these goals are ends that Congress has chosen to pursue by means of protecting
the physical environment") (footnote omitted) (emphases in original); CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing "the dangers that
beset us when we lose sight of the First Amendment itself, and march off in blind pursuit of
its 'values' "); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.
1976) (Friendly, J.) ("courts had better not depart from their [statutes'] words without
strong support for the conviction that ... they are doing what Congress wanted when they
refuse to do what it said").
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filling authority. The way to preserve the initial choice is for judges
to put the statute down once it becomes clear that the legislature
has selected rules as well as identified goals.
This approach is faithful to the nature of compromise in pri-
vate interest legislation. It also gives the legislature a low-cost
method to signal its favored judicial approach to public interest
legislation. A legislature that tries to approach the line where costs
begin to exceed benefits is bound to leave a trail of detailed provi-
sions, which on this approach would preclude judges from attempt-
ing to fill gaps. The approach also is supported by a number of
other considerations. First, it recognizes that courts cannot recon-
struct an original meaning because there is none to find. Second, it
prevents legislatures from extending their lives beyond the terms
of their members. Third, it takes a liberal view of the relation be-
tween the public and private spheres. Fourth, it takes a realistic
view of judges' powers. I elaborate on these below.
1. Original Meaning. Because legislatures comprise many
members, they do not have "intents" or "designs," hidden yet dis-
coverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The body
as a whole, however, has only outcomes. It is not only impossible to
reason from one statute to another but also impossible to reason
from one or more sections of a statute to a problem not resolved.
This follows from the discoveries of public choice theory. Al-
though legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and
preferences, it turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to
aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice.20 Every sys-
tem of voting has flaws. The one used by legislatures is particularly
dependent on the order in which decisions are made. Legislatures
customarily consider proposals one at a time and then vote them
up or down. This method disregards third or fourth options and
the intensity with which legislators prefer one option over another.
Additional options can be considered only in sequence, and this
makes the order of decision vital. It is fairly easy to show that
someone with control of the agenda can manipulate the choice so
that the legislature adopts proposals that only a minority sup-
port.21 The existence of agenda control makes it impossible for a
"O See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); D.
BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE
(1979).
" See Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REv. 561
(1977), Long & Rose-Ackerman, Winning the Contest by Agenda Manipulation, 2 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 123, 124-25 (1982), and Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and Dereg-
ulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships, LAW & CONrEMP.
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court-even one that knows each legislator's complete table of
preferences-to say what the whole body would have done with a
proposal it did not consider in fact.
One countervailing force is logrolling, in which legislators ex-
press the intensity of their preferences by voting against their
views on some proposals in order to obtain votes for other propos-
als about which their views are stronger. Yet when logrolling is at
work the legislative process is submerged and courts lose the infor-
mation they need to divine the body's design. A successful logroll-
ing process yields unanimity on every recorded vote22 and indeter-
minacy on all issues for which there is no recorded vote.
In practice, the order of decisions and logrolling are not total
bars to judicial understanding. But they are so integral to the legis-
lative process that judicial predictions of how the legislature would
have decided issues it did not in fact decide are bound to be little
more than wild guesses, and thus to lack the legitimacy that might
be accorded to astute guesses. Moreover, because control of the
agenda and logrolling are accepted parts of the legislative process,
a court has no justification for deciding cases as it thinks the legis-
lature would in their absence. It might as well try to decide how
the legislature would have acted were there no threat of veto or no
need to cater to constituents.
2. Legislatures Expire. Judicial interpolation of legislative
gaps would be questionable even if judges could ascertain with cer-
tainty how the legislature would have acted. Every legislative
body's power is limited by a number of checks, from the demands
of its internal procedures to bicameralism to the need to obtain the
executive's assent. The foremost of these checks is time. Each ses-
sion of Congress, for example, lasts but two years, after which the
whole House and one-third of the Senate stand for reelection.
What each Congress does binds the future until another Congress
acts, but what a Congress might have done, had it the time, is sim-
ply left unresolved. The unaddressed problem is handled by a new
legislature with new instructions from the voters.
If time is classified with the veto as a limit on the power of
legislatures, then one customary argument for judicial gap
filling-that legislatures lack the time and foresight to resolve
PROBS., Winter 1981, at 147, 154-61, for informal discussions, and McKelvey, General Con-
ditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models, 47 ECONOMTRICA 1085 (1979),
for formal proof.




every problem"-is a reason why judges should not attempt to fill
statutory gaps. The shortness of time and the want of foresight,
like the fear of the veto and the fear of offending constituents,
raise the costs of legislation. The cost of addressing one problem
includes the inability, for want of time, to address others. If courts
routinely construe statutory gaps as authorizing "more in the same
vein," they reduce this cost.24
In a sense, gap-filling construction has the same effects as ex-
tending the term of the legislature and allowing that legislature to
avoid submitting its plan to the executive for veto. Obviously no
court would do this directly. If the members of the Ninety-third
Congress reassembled next month and declared their legislative
meaning, the declaration would have absolutely no force. This
rump body would get no greater power by claiming that its new
"laws" were intimately related to, and just filled gaps in, its old
ones. Is there a better reason why the members of the Ninety-third
Congress, the Eighty-third, and the Seventy-third, "sitting" in the
minds of judges, should continue to be able to resolve new
problems "presented" to them? The meta-rule I have suggested
reduces the number of times judges must summon up the ghouls of
legislatures past. In order to authorize judges (or agencies) to fill
statutory gaps, the legislature must deny itself life after death and
permit judges or agencies to supply their own conceptions of the
public interest.
3. Liberal Principles. A principle that statutes are inapplicable
unless they either plainly supply a rule of decision or delegate the
power to create such a rule is consistent with the liberal principles
underlying our political order. Those who wrote and approved the
Constitution thought that most social relations would be governed
by private agreements, customs, and understandings, not resolved
in the halls of government. There is still at least a presumption
that people's arrangements prevail unless expressly displaced by
legal doctrine. All things are permitted unless there is some con-
" See Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning,
36 IND. L.J. 414 (1961); Posner, supra note 2, at 812.
"4 Gap-filling construction has some similarities to the one- and two-house vetoes, two
other devices for reducing the cost of lawmaking and permitting any given meeting of Con-
gress to increase its control, perhaps at the expense of the President. See Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 51 U.S.L.W. 4907 (U.S. June 23, 1983); Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd mem. sub
nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 51 U.S.L.W. 3935
(U.S. July 6, 1983).
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trary rule.2 5 It is easier for an agency to justify the revocation of
rules (or simple nonregulation) than the creation of new rules. 26 A
rule declaring statutes inapplicable unless they plainly resolve or
delegate the solution of the matter respects this position. It either
preserves the private decisions or remits the questions to other
statutes through which the legislature may have addressed the
problem. A rule of universal construction, in contrast, assumes that
statutes supply an answer to all questions.
Perhaps one day the "orgy of statute making" 27 will reach the
point at which the preservation of private decisions is the excep-
tion, but that point is not yet here and, one hopes, will never ar-
rive. Like nature, regulation abhors a vacuum, and the existence of
one law may create problems requiring more laws. Until the legis-
lature supplies the fix or authorizes someone else to do so, there is
no reason for judges to rush in.
4. Judicial Abilities. Statutory construction is an art. Good
statutory construction requires the rarest of skills. The judge must
find clues in the structure of the statute, hints in the legislative
history, and combine these with mastery of history, command of
psychology, and sensitivity to nuance to divine how deceased legis-
lators would have answered unasked questions.
It is all very well to say that a judge able to understand the
temper of 1871 (and 1921), and able to learn the extent of a com-
promise in 1936, may do well when construing statutes. How many
judges meet this description? How many know what clauses and
provisos, capable of being enacted in 1923, would have been un-
thinkable in 1927 because of subtle changes in the composition of
the dominant coalitions in Congress? It is hard enough to know
this for the immediate past, yet who could deny that legislation
that could have been passed in 1982 not only would fail but also
could be repealed in 1983? The number of judges living at any
time who can, with plausible claim to accuracy, "think [them-
selves] . . . into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine
how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at
25 This approach, explicit in the federalists' idea of limited government, also underlies
the contemporary state action cases, which assume that the government is responsible for
action only when it either acts directly or supplies the rule of decision that private parties
must use. Compare Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2748-54 (1982) (finding
state action) with Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 2770-71 (1982) (finding no state
action) and Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 149-66 (1978) (same).
28 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 51 U.S.L.W. 4953, 4956 (June 24, 1983).
27 G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERIcAN LAw 95 (1977).
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bar,' '28 may be counted on one hand.
To deny that judges have the skills necessary to construe stat-
utes well-at least when construction involves filling gaps in the
statutes rather than settling the rare case that arises from conflicts
in the rules actually laid down-is not to say that stupid and irre-
sponsible judges can twist any rule. Doubtless the "judge's role
should be limited, to protect against willful judges who lack
humility and self-restraint."29 Yet there is a more general reason
for limiting the scope of judicial discretion. Few of the best-inten-
tioned, most humble, and most restrained among us have the skills
necessary to learn the temper of times before our births, to assume
the identity of people we have never met, and to know how 535
disparate characters from regions of great political and economic
diversity would have answered questions that never occurred to
them. Anyone of reasonable skill could tell that some answers
would have been beyond belief in 1866.30 After putting the impos-
sible to one side, though, a judge must choose from among the pos-
sible solutions, and here human ingenuity is bound to fail, often.
When it fails, even the best intentioned will find that the imagined
dialogues of departed legislators have much in common with their
own conceptions of the good. 1
VI
This is most certainly not to say that statutory construction is
a bad, or even that it is a necessary evil. Most statutes contain a
substantial core of understandable commands. Most exercises of
construction are ordinary attempts to supply a meaning where leg-
islators plainly intended the statute to apply but did not say what
the application entailed. It is clear they did something, and the
question is what, particularly, with respect to some unanticipated
set of events. Finding out what the statute means, even if this calls
for creation as well as re-creation, is an essential part of govern-
ment, lest statutes become brittle and fail of their essential pur-
poses. I have been addressing the problems that arise when legisla-
tors did nothing about some sizable class of cases, when the
"8 Posner, supra note 2, at 817.
29 Summers, Frankfurter, Labor Law and the Judge's Function, 67 YALE L.J. 266, 282-
83 (1957) (describing Justice Frankfurter's views).
so See C. FAnRmAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECON-
STRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 (pt. I), at 1207-60 (1971), and Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio,
Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 89, both discussing Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
31 See E. HmscH, THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION 20 (1976).
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community of readers does not agree on meaning, and agencies or
judges must determine whether to take the legislators at their
(non) word, and declare the legislation inapplicable, or leap into
the gap with an exercise of construction, as if the legislators had
spoken.
Declaring legislation inapplicable unless it either expressly ad-
dresses the matter or commits the matter to the common law (or
administrative) process would not produce unalloyed benefits. It is
easy enough to imagine some horror in which nonapplication per-
petrates gross injustice. The price principals pay for reducing the
discretion of their agents includes the lost opportunities to carry
out the principals' goals in ways the principals could not have an-
ticipated when they issued their commands. Yet it is well under-
stood that a decision to grant or withhold discretion from agents
requires a careful balancing of costs. A reduction in discretion may
mean lost opportunities, but an increase in discretion may mean
that agents distort or deviate from the principals' plans.
The choice between the costs of too much and too little discre-
tion properly lies with the legislature. There is no basis for a pre-
sumption against applicability; there is no basis for a rule preserv-
ing private orderings; there is not even a basis for the assumption
(employed tacitly so far) that there are only two outcomes, appli-
cation and nonapplication. There are shades of applicability, with
color densities properly a legislative matter. Perhaps substantive
rules and remedial rules require different approaches.2 This essay
does not begin to exhaust the considerations. The meta-rule I have
suggested, calling for "construction" only when the statute either
plainly addresses a problem or requires someone else (judges or ad-
ministrators) to supply their own solutions, best approximates the
choice legislators would reach if they could select an option-and
enforce it, no small matter!-at no cost. The rule would enhance
the power of the legislature by specifying a vocabulary for convey-
ing its decisions to its judicial agents. The suggestion is tentative,
and the arguments are far from complete. But it is, I think, more
faithful to the organizing principles of our government than the
usual assumption of universal construction.
32 A possibility suggested in Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
643-47 (1981).
